DEREGULATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRICITY: PRICE AND WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF SPATIAL OLIGOPOLY WITH UNIFORM DELIVERED PRICES*
构建空间寡头垄断模型，模拟放松电力零售价格管制（配送功能）对价格和福利的影响，发现纽约州北部短期电价可能上涨14%至37%。
ABSTRACT. Theoretical, spatial oligopoly models are developed and calibrated to simulate the price and welfare consequences of deregulating the retail price of electricity (the distribution function), assuming competing sources of generation supply are available. Two types of distribution competition are considered, retaining the currently used uniform delivered pricing structure: competition for customers at neighboring utilities’ borders and franchise competition. Because duplicate facilities are required for borderline competition, short‐run price increases ranging between 14 and 37 percent over existing regulated prices are estimated for upstate New York, largely because deregulated prices reflect replacement, not historic, costs of facilities.