Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation
研究发现，追求相对援助效果最大化的捐赠者会在唯一纳什均衡中分散预算至多个受援国，导致援助碎片化；即使无固定成本，这种均衡也可能低效，且低效程度随捐赠者预算平等性增加而加剧。
This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.