Feasible Bayesian Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets
研究在可行集随状态变化的环境中，如何设计机制实现社会目标，给出了可行贝叶斯实施的充要条件，并应用于交换经济中初始禀赋不确定的情形。
This paper considers feasible Bayesian implementation for an environment with state dependent feasible sets. We assume no externality in individual feasibility constraint sets and no exaggeration on the part of agents, but allow for flexible information structures. Bayesian Incentive Compatibility, Closure, and Bayesian Monotonicity are found to be necessary and sufficient for feasible Bayesian implementation. This result is applied to an exchange economy where agents have fixed preferences but uncertain initial endowments and complete information. A condition called the Endowment Condition, which is weaker than Individual Rationality, is identified as necessary and sufficient for feasible Nash implementation.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D70; D71; D74; D82.