Nash Equilibrium Efficiency Wage Distributions
在效率工资的偷懒模型中引入工人努力负效用的异质性，导致逆向选择问题，证明均衡中企业会提供连续可微的工资分布，并针对均匀分布情形显式求解。
This paper extends the shirking model of efficiency wages by introducing worker heterogeneity with respect to the disutility of effort. Heterogeneity leads to a problem of adverse selection in addition to the moral hazard problem that is present in the original model. As a result of adverse selection, an equilibrium in which all firms offer the same efficiency wage cannot exist; rather, a continuously differentiable distribution of wages will be offered in equilibrium. We demonstrate this equilibrium by construction, and derive it explicitly in the case of a uniform distribution of the effort aversion parameter.