The Role of Real Wage Rigidity and Labor Market Frictions for Inflation Persistence
在新凯恩斯商业周期模型中分析工资向通胀的传导机制，发现工资谈判方式对实际工资刚性影响通胀持续性至关重要：标准纳什谈判下效果模糊，而“管理权”谈判下工资刚性直接导致通胀更持久。
We analyze the transmission mechanism of wages to inflation within a New Keynesian business cycle model with wage rigidities and labor market frictions. Our main focus is on the channel of real wage rigidities on inflation persistence for which we find the specification of the wage bargaining process to be of crucial importance. Under the standard efficient Nash bargaining, the feedback of wage rigidities on inflation is ambiguous and depends on other labor market variables. However, under the alternative right‐to‐manage bargaining we find that more rigid wages translate directly into more persistent movements of aggregate inflation.