Treble Damages and the Incentive to Sue and Settle
运用Png（1983）模型分析反垄断诉讼中私人诉讼与政府诉讼的相互影响，发现违法者为威慑三倍赔偿诉讼而发出强案信号，迫使政府增加审判；私人原告在政府诉讼后更可能和解，但胜诉概率不变。
We apply Png's (1983) model to antitrust suits to determine the effects of private suits on government suits and vice versa. In equilibrium, a defendant can probabilistically signal a strong case by not offering to settle. A violator's incentive to signal a strong case to deter a treble damage suit forces the government to pursue more trials than it would otherwise. Private plaintiffs are more likely to settle following a government suit than otherwise, but they win a trial with the same probability regardless of whether there was a previous government suit. Data on private suits support the latter two contentions.