Fiscal Crisis and Institutional Change in the Ottoman Empire and France
通过比较16世纪法国和奥斯曼帝国的财政制度演变，研究为何一些国家更早采纳促进增长的制度，发现法国税吏成功约束了王权，而奥斯曼税吏因交易成本过高未能实现类似变革。
Why is it that some countries adopted growth enhancing institutions earlier than others during the early modern period? We address this question through a comparative study of the evolution of French and Ottoman fiscal institutions. During the sixteenth century, both countries made extensive use of tax farming to collect revenue, however, uncertain property rights caused by fiscal pressure led to different paths of institutional change in each state. In France, tax collectors successfully overcame the collective action costs of imposing constraint on the king. In the Ottoman Empire, tax collectors faced prohibitive transaction costs to organizing in a similar manner.