Optimal Second-Stage Outsourcing
分析制造商将产品组装任务外包给供应商的决策，发现当第一或第二阶段成本上升时外包更有利，但供应商承担大额责任的能力会降低外包吸引力，且外包时制造商倾向于增加测试。
Manufacturers have recently begun outsourcing product assembly and completion tasks to their suppliers. Such outsourcing solves several contracting problems but generates new incentive frictions between manufacturers and their suppliers. In this paper, we analyze a manufacturer's decision to outsource an assembly (second-stage) task to a preestablished supplier. We find that outsourcing second-stage tasks becomes more attractive as the cost of either the first- or second-stage activity rises. Outsourcing becomes less attractive when the supplier is unable to accept large levels of liability. The manufacturer is shown to prefer more testing when she outsources assembly to her supplier as opposed to when she assembles products in house. Last, we find that the contracting frictions identified persist when the supplier's work can be tested individually, albeit imperfectly.