Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry
构建并估计了一个工资决定与工会-非工会工资差异的理论模型，将纳什-泽森-哈萨尼模型与议价能力和分歧恐惧等制度概念结合，利用1950年代中期至1970年代末12家公司和工会的数据进行估计，发现谈判结果通常偏离纳什-泽森-哈萨尼解，且受外生因素显著影响，不支持传统劳动经济学中谈判解位于劳动边际收益产品曲线的结论。
The paper develops and estimates a theoretical model of wage determination and union-nonunion wage differentials. In order to overcome the institutional ctiticisms of the formal bargaining literature, the paper generalizes the Nash-Zeuthen-Harsanyi model by linking the solution to the institutional concepts of bargaining power and fear or cost of disagreement and by making the outcome depend not only on endogenous but also on exogenous factors. An operational specification of bargaining power and fear of disagreement allows the model to be estimated with data covering twelve companies and trade unions during the period from mid-1950's to the late 1970's. While giving limited support to the NashZeuthen-Harsanyi solution, the empirical analysis indicates that the bargaining outcome usually deviates from the Nash-Zeuthen-Harsanyi point and, in accordance with the institutionalist claim, that it varies significantly with exogenous factors. Contrary to the traditional labor economics view, the results do not support the general conclusion that the bargaining solution lies on the marginal revenue product curve of labor. Instead, the relevant coefficients suggest that for many firms and unions the outcome might be better characterized by the efficient contract (vertical contract curve).