The Theory of Syndicates and Linear Sharing Rules
采用Borch和Wilson的方法分析交换经济均衡，修正了Wilson的主要结论，指出线性合同是辛迪加在异质信念下存在的充分但非必要条件，并引入可分解性概念，证明线性合同仅对任意可分解的辛迪加是必要的。
We analyze equilibria in exchange economies following the approach taken by Borch and Wilson. We correct Wilson's main result by showing that linear contracts are sufficient but not necessary for the existence of syndicates under heterogeneous beliefs. We introduce the concept of the decomposability of syndicates and demonstrate that linear contracts are necessary only for arbitrarily decomposable syndicates. This implies that groups that form syndicates under an arbitrary set of beliefs must also employ linear contracts.