Asymmetric Information Concerning the Variance of Cash Flows: The Capital Structure Choice
假设高价值公司的现金流分布方差更低，构建了一个分离均衡信号模型，公司通过债务和股利水平向市场传递现金流方差信息，高价值公司通过发行新股（降低杠杆）同时支付现金股利来传递信号。
This paper assumes that a higher valued firm is distinguished from its lower valued counterpart by having a cash flow distribution with a lower variance. A separating (sequential) Nash equilibrium signaling model is developed in which firms use the levels of debt and dividends to convey information to the market regarding the variance of their underlying cash flow. In contrast to most, if not all, debt signaling models, the higher quality firm signals its value by issuing new equity (decreasing the leverage) while simultaneously offering cash dividends. Copyright 1998 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.