Contract Design for the Purchase of Environmental Goods from Agriculture
结合微观参数分布模型与机制设计原理，设计了一个环境管理计划，通过直接支付农民环境产品来克服信息不对称和税收无谓损失，推导出最优投入和支付方案。
Abstract An environmental stewardship program, whereby farmers are paid directly for the environmental goods they provide, is developed by combining the microparameter distribution model with mechanism design principles. The program overcomes the information asymmetry between farmers and governments and accounts for the deadweight losses from distortionary taxes. The characteristics of optimal input and payment schedules of the program are derived. These optimal schedules are determined by the tradeoffs between farming profits, environmental benefits, and deadweight losses from taxes, and are second‐best except under restrictive conditions on deadweight losses from taxes and on the marginal product of inputs and marginal pollution costs.