Efficient Bargains and the McDonald-Solow Conjecture
检验了麦克唐纳和索洛关于工资与就业谈判结果可近似由工资与劳动资本比谈判实现的猜想，发现该猜想一般不成立，并提出了检验模型的方法。
This article explores the conjecture of I. McDonald and R. Solow (1981) that the outcome from a bargain over wages and employment can be approximately achieved by a bargain over wages and the labor-capital ratio (the "crew size"), where the latter can be argued to be more representative of the real world. The author derives a crew size contract curve and shows that this conjecture is not generally true. A test to determine which model is generating real-world data is suggested. The wage rigidity results derived by McDonald and Solow for their contract cure do not apply to this crew size contract curve. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.