Naked Exclusion: Comment
评论了在位企业通过排他性合同阻止进入的能力，反驳了认为在位企业无法从排他中获利的观点，并引用了Rasmusen等人的研究。
The ability of an incumbent firm to deter entry by writing exclusionary contracts with customers has been a subject of contention in the antitrust literature. The courts ’ concern with such exclusionary contracts has been challenged by those who argue that an incumbent, faced with buyers whose interest is to promote entry and competition, would have to pay buyers more for the inclusion of exclusionary provisions than it could possibly gain from exclusion. In a provocative article, Eric B. Rasmusen et al. (1991) (henceforth, RRW) have argued that an incumbent may in fact be able to exclude rivals profitably using such contractual provisions