Bonus Payments versus Efficiency Wages in the Repeated Principal-Agent Model with Subjective Evaluations
研究了无限重复委托代理模型中主观评价下的效率工资均衡与奖金支付均衡的剩余比较，发现奖金支付均衡随耐心增加趋近效率，而效率工资均衡的收益远离帕累托前沿。
We study an infinitely repeated principal-agent model with subjective evaluations. We compare the surplus in efficiency-wage equilibria and in bonus-payments equilibria. The agent receives a constant wage and is motivated by the threat of dismissal in efficiency-wage equilibria. The agent receives a bonus and quits the relationship after disagreements between his self-evaluation and the principal's performance appraisal in bonus-payments equilibria. We construct a class of equilibria with bonus payments that approach efficiency as patience increases. In contrast, payoffs from efficiency-wage equilibria are bounded away from the Pareto-payoff frontier for any discount factor.