Existence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economy
证明了一个模型中均衡的存在性，该模型中的中央机构根据代理人的政治活动设定相对价格，通过将游说经济重新表述为非合作广义博弈并证明其均衡存在，解决了代理人选择集非凸的难题。
This paper establishes the existence of equilibrium in a model with a central authority that sets relative prices in response to agents' political activity. To a small open economy we graft a government price setting program that responds to the lobbying pressure of opposing interests. The proof involves reformulating the lobbying economy as a noncooperative generalized game, establishing the existence of an equilibrium in the game, and showing that a game equilibrium is an equilibrium in the economy. Agents' choice sets are found to be nonconvex, a difficulty that we resolve by an appropriate restriction on preferences.