Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships
构建模型说明银行与企业的客户关系源于贷款过程中的信息不对称，导致银行对老客户收取租金，对新客户提供低利率贷款，从而扭曲资本配置，并探讨了完全合约或声誉支持的隐性承诺如何消除这种低效率。
ABSTRACT Customer relationships arise between banks and firms because, in the process of lending, a bank learns more than others about its own customers. This information asymmetry allows lenders to capture some of the rents generated by their older customers; competition thus drives banks to lend to new firms at interest rates which initially generate expected losses. As a result, the allocation of capital is shifted toward lower quality and inexperienced firms. This inefficiency is eliminated if complete contingent contracts are written or, when this is costly, if banks can make nonbinding commitments that, in equilibrium, are backed by reputation.