Triadic Power Relations in Rural Nepal
扩展了Basu的三元权力模型，利用尼泊尔生活标准测量研究数据，发现农村工资受地主数量、与商人距离、劳动者特征及外部市场距离影响，且商人影响力取决于地主数量。
Abstract We generalise Basu's model of triadic power. For one landlord and multiple merchants the landlord's threat towards a labourer becomes credible in the original stage game. For multiple landlords and merchants we generalise more recent solutions. We estimate a reduced form of the model, where equilibrium rural wages are a function of the number of landlords, distance to merchants, characteristics of the labourers and the distance to external markets. We apply Living Standards Measurement Study data from Nepal, and find support for the triadic model. In particular, the influence via the merchants depends on the number of landlords.