Monopoly and Oligopoly Provision of Addictive Goods
研究非竞争性市场（垄断和寡头）供给成瘾品时的均衡结果，发现某些情况下产量可能高于有效水平、价格低于边际成本，且市场势力可能不利。
This article investigates monopoly and oligopoly provision of an addictive good. Consumer preferences are modeled as in Becker and Murphy (1988). Addictive goods have characteristics that create interesting strategic issues when suppliers are noncompetitive. We characterize the perfect Markov equilibrium of a market with noncompetitive supply of an addictive good and compare it with the efficient solution. Depending on particular parameter values, we find a wide variety of possible steady‐state outcomes, including ones with output above the efficient level and price below marginal cost. We also find that market power can be disadvantageous.