Price Formation Under Small Numbers Competition: Evidence from Land Auctions in Singapore
利用新加坡土地拍卖数据，检验了首价密封投标拍卖中投标价格低于零利润资产价值的理论，并发现竞标者数量增加会推高预期售价。
This article examines the price formation process under small numbers competition using data from Singapore land auctions. The theory predicts that bid prices are less than the zero‐profit asset value in these first‐price sealed‐bid auctions. The model also shows that expected sales price increases with the number of bidders both because each bidder has an incentive to offer a higher price and because of a greater likelihood that a high‐value bidder is present. The empirical estimates are consistent with auction theory and show that the standard land attributes are reflected in auction prices as expected.