Preferencing, Internalization of Order Flow, and Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Experiments
通过实验室资产市场实验，研究偏好安排和默契合谋。实验发现，尽管部分市场竞争激烈，但多个市场达到宽价差和几乎完全内部化订单流的合谋均衡，并探讨了市场透明度和传递订单流对报价行为的影响。
This paper examines preferencing arrangements and tacit collusion in laboratory asset markets. In the experiments, dealers may internalize by matching the best quote or by passing orders to the dealer posting the best quote. Although some markets were highly competitive, several markets reached a collusive equilibrium with wide spreads and near complete intemalization of order flow. The paper further examines the role of market transparency and passed order flow on quote-setting behavior and suggests that these affect the mechanism leading to tacitly collusive equilibria.