On Tariff Preferences and Delegation Decisions in Customs Unions: A Heckscher–Ohlin Approach
研究关税同盟成员国对共同对外关税水平的偏好，并扩展了关于贸易政策授权决策的文献，发现补偿价格进口需求弹性取决于要素禀赋和技术差异，有助于确定最优政策制定者。
This paper studies preferences of customs union (CU) members over common external tariff (CET) levels and extends the literature on delegation decisions over trade policy in models with production. In a model with similar CU members, we prove that most--preferred CETs can be ranked with the help of compensated price elasticities of import demand functions. In the Heckscher--Ohlin trade model, we show these elasticities depend on inter--country differences in relative factor endowments and inter--sectoral differences in technology. This helps identify the optimal policy maker in a CU and demonstrates delegation decisions over trade policy can be integrated into mainstream trade theory. Copyright 2002 Royal Economic Society