Cooperative and Non-cooperative R&D in Oligopoly with Spillovers
比较了寡头垄断市场中合作与非合作研发的福利效果，发现当研发溢出效应足够大时，两种均衡都无法达到次优研发水平；无溢出时，非合作研发可能过度。
This paper examines the positive and normative effects of cooperative R&D--whereby member firms commit themselves to the joint profit-maximizing level of R&D in a "precompetitive stage" but remain fierce competitors in the product market--vis-a-vis noncooperative R&D, socially first-best R&D, and socially second-best R&D. In the presence of sufficiently large R&D spillovers, neither noncooperative nor cooperative equilibria achieve even second-best R&D levels. In the absence of spillover effects, however, while the cooperative R&D level remains socially insufficient, the noncooperative level may overshoot first- and second-best levels of R&D. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.