Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment
通过理论和实验证明，在一级价格拍卖中，投标人因预期到输掉拍卖后的后悔情绪而过度出价，且不同的信息反馈结构会影响这种后悔效应。
This paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first-price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret (felt when bidders lose at an affordable price). Different information structures are created to elicit regret: bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose (loser regret condition); or the second-highest bid if they win (winner regret condition); or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids. Bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid. However, bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret.