Insider Trading Liability and Enforcement Strategy
评估内幕交易责任的法律理论和政府执法效果，发现法规对注册和临时内幕人有效，但未能阻止外部内幕人交易。
Professor of Finance at University of Missouri-St. Louis. Illegal insider trading volume and profitability have increased while the regulatory environment has become more restrictive. This paper explains this puzzling evidence by evaluating the effectiveness of legal theories of insider-trading liability and government enforcement. Registered insiders are forbidden from trading on material non-public information based on the disclose-or-abstain theory or the misappropriation theory. Temporary insiders have liabilities similar to registered insiders. In takeover cases, this status is accorded to those connected to both the target and bidding firms. This paper concludes that insider-trading regulation has been reasonably effective in deterring illegal insider trading by registered and temporary insiders. It has, however, failed to deter illegal outside-insider trading.