Mortal Managers and Long-Term Goals: An Impossibility Result
证明，在经理有寿命且努力与风险中性的条件下，由于雇主无法精确了解经理的能力和行动，任何契约都无法实现最优结果；若经理折现率低于所有者，道德风险会导致类似短视的低效率。
This article examines decision myopia under effort and risk neutrality. An infinite, non-overlapping sequence of mortal managers is selected and their performance evaluated. Contracts admit premature termination. Plant condition depends on maintenance, which induces an interstage linkage in production. When ability and action are imprecisely known by employers, no contract achieves the first-best outcome. Furthermore, if the manager discounts less than the owners, inefficiency is partially due to moral hazard, which resembles myopia. Optimal contracts infer ability and motivate behavior via manipulation of wage schedules and tenure guidelines.