Deception Through Telling the Truth?! Experimental Evidence from Individuals and Teams
通过廉价谈话实验证明，如果发送方预期接收方不会相信其真实信息，那么说实话也可被视为欺骗，实验数据表明这种“高级”欺骗普遍存在，且团队决策中结果稳健。
Informational asymmetries abound in economic decision making and often provide an incentive for deception through telling a lie or misrepresenting information. In this article I use a cheap-talk sender-receiver experiment to show that telling the truth should be classified as deception too if the sender chooses the true message with the expectation that the receiver will not follow the sender's (true) message. The experimental data reveal a large degree of 'sophisticated' deception through telling the truth. The robustness of my broader definition of deception is confirmed in an experimental treatment where teams make decisions. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.