Creating Expectational Assets in the Laboratory: Coordination in ‘Weakest-Link’ Games
研究多均衡协调博弈中玩家因选择高于最小值而受罚、偏好更大最小值的情形，实验发现最优均衡很少达到，合并两组总是有害，并将玩家信念视为社会复杂的期望资产或负债。
We study coordination games with multiple equilibria, in which players are penalized for picking numbers higher than the minimum anybody picks, and everyone prefers a larger minimum. ‘Weakest-link games like this model organizational situations in which the worst component of a product or process determines its overall quality. In experimental groups, the best equilibrium was reached infrequently. Aggregating two groups into a larger one always hurt. We argue that players’ beliefs about what the minimum will be are an ‘expectational asset’ (or liability) which is socially complex, linking organization-level behavior and the resource-based view of the firm.