Efficiency and Vertical Integration: The Case of Mine-Mouth Electric Generating Plants
通过估计坑口发电厂的行为成本函数，检验了纵向一体化与非一体化企业在投入配置效率和技术效率上的差异，发现一体化企业技术效率更高，而非一体化企业利用交易专用投资获得垄断买方权力。
This paper tests four propositions regarding the efficiency of vertical arrangements: (1) vertically integrated and nonintegrated firms allocate inputs with efficiency and (2) achieve equal technical efficiency; (3) upstream transaction-specific investments provide monopsony power; and (4) monopsony behavior does not differ by vertical arrangement. A behavioral cost function for mine-mouth generating plants is estimated. The findings include significant differences in the allocative efficiency of integrated versus nonintegrated plants and increased technical efficiency for vertically integrated plants. Transaction-specific investments in mines provide monopsony power. Nonintegrated plants exercise this power, while integrated plants do not. Copyright 1991 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.