Resale Price Maintenance and Manufacturer Competition for Exclusive Dealerships
研究了两个制造商通过独家零售商分销品牌时，转售价格维持（最高或最低限价）对零售价格的影响，发现传统结论在制造商能同时设定批发价和特许费时可能反转。
Two manufacturers distribute their brands through exclusive retail dealers and must compete for consumers indirectly by inducing retailers to carry their brands. The authors compare equilibrium outcomes with and without resale price maintenance. Maximum resale price maintenance lowers the retail price if manufacturers cannot employ franchise fees. Minimum retail price maintenance raises the retail price if manufacturers cannot set a wholesale price above marginal cost and must employ only a franchise fee. However, these traditional insights are reversed if manufacturers can set both a wholesale price and a franchise fee in the equilibrium without retail price maintenance. Copyright 1991 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.