Do They Walk the Talk? Gauging Acquiring CEO and Director Confidence in the Value Creation Potential of Announced Acquisitions
研究收购公告后CEO和董事的股权调整行为，发现CEO倾向于行权或卖股，董事则授予期权，表明他们并不预期收购能长期创造价值。
We explore whether acquiring CEOs and directors act consistently with the idea that their newly announced acquisitions will increase long-term firm value. Specifically, we examine postannouncement adjustments to CEOs' equity-based holdings and find acquiring CEOs tend to exercise options and sell firm stock following acquisition announcements. Moreover, positive short-term market performance exacerbates this effect. Further, we find directors tend to grant their acquiring CEOs stock options, after acquisition announcement, presumably to more tightly align CEO-shareholder interests. These findings suggest that when CEOs and directors manage acquiring CEOs' equity-based holdings, they do not appear to anticipate long-term value creation from their acquisitions.