Optimal Governing Instrument, Operation Level, and Enforcement in Natural Resource Regulation: The Case of the Fishery
构建了一个模型，分析利润最大化的企业如何根据政府的治理工具、执法程序和处罚结构等控制变量做出反应，并推导出两组控制变量的最优操作水平。
Abstract Most regulation studies have used industry output or inputs as the control variable(s), but these are only indirectly controlled by government action through its choice of governing instrument, enforcement procedure, and penalty structure and the operational level of each. A model is developed which demonstrates how profit‐maximizing firms will react to these control variables taking into account the benefits (extra production) and costs (possible penalties) of noncompliance and the ability to avoid detection of noncompliance. The optimal operation level for two sets of control variables is derived and discussed.