Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy
解释为何通胀有时高有时低，认为缺乏承诺的货币政策会导致多重均衡（预期陷阱），公众的预期迫使政策迎合，而承诺机制可避免高通胀反复。
Why is inflation persistently high in some periods and low in others? The reason may be the absence of commitment in monetary policy. In a standard model, absence of commitment leads to multiple equilibria, or expectation traps, even without trigger strategies. In these traps, expectations of high or low inflation lead the public to take defensive actions, which then make accommodating those expectations the optimal monetary policy. Under commitment, the equilibrium is unique and the inflation rate is low on average. This analysis suggests that institutions which promote commitment can prevent high inflation episodes from recurring. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.