The Contractors' Game
构建了一个多项目承包的对称信息拍卖模型，发现当承包商众多或只有一项工作时，存在零期望利润的对称混合策略均衡，且中标价会反常地随承包商数量上升；当只有两个投标人和两三项工作时，均衡结果倾向于分割市场，看似反竞争却无合谋。
We develop a symmetric-information auction model of multiproject contracting with costly bidding and increasing marginal performance costs. When there are many potential contractors or only one job, there is a zero-expected-profit symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies. The winning bid at this equilibrium tends to rise (perversely) with the number of contractors. When there are only two potential bidders and either two or three jobs, multiple bids of a contractor at equilibrium are negatively correlated with each other. The resulting equilibrium outcome tends to divide the market between the contractors in a manner that suggests anticompetitive behavior despite the absence of any collusion.