A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection
构建了逆向选择市场的瓦尔拉斯理论，证明均衡在标准条件下存在，并利用均衡精炼唯一刻画均衡结果，适用于单边和双边不确定性市场。
The paper describes a Walrasian theory of markets with adverse selection and shows how refinements of equilibrium can be used to characterize uniquely the equilibrium outcome. Equilibrium exists under standard conditions. It is shown that, under certain conditions, a stable set exists and is contained in a connected set of equilibria. For generic models there exists a stable outcome, that is, all the equilibria in the stable set have the same outcome. These ideas are applied to markets with one-sided and two-sided uncertainty. Under standard monotonicity conditions, it is shown that the stable outcome is separating and implies a particular pattern of matches of buyers and sellers.