Investor Activism and Financial Market Structure
研究多个战略投资者同时存在时，他们如何通过监督和交易来制约管理层机会主义，发现核心监督者会内生形成并积极行动，且持股最小的积极投资者反而最激进。
This article investigates investor activism when there are a number of strategic investors that are capable of intervening in corporate governance. These strategic investors can monitor and/or trade in anonymous financial markets. In equilibrium, a core group of monitoring investors emerges endogenously to curtail managerial opportunism. These core activists both intervene and trade aggressively. Although the smallest investors are passive, there is no monotonic relationship between the size of preexisting shareholdings and activism. In fact, among those investors who choose activism, those with the smallest holdings are the most aggressive.