Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices Under Private Information
构建了一个货币与搜寻模型，其中议价决定价格且商品质量是私人信息，研究柠檬问题如何影响货币购买力，发现存在多重帕累托排序均衡，并对信息稀缺性、价格离散及通货膨胀的影响进行了分析。
This paper presents a model of money and search where bargaining determines prices and the quality of goods is private information. It studies how a lemons problem affects the purchasing power of money. There are multiple, Pareto‐ranked equilibria. The superior equilibrium, where no lemons are produced, exists even if information about quality is relatively scarce. In other equilibria, there is price dispersion, and uninformed buyers pay higher prices than informed buyers for all goods. Taxing money balances (a proxy for inflation) makes buyers less selective, thus reducing the average quality of supply and the premium paid for known quality.