Transferable Licenses Versus Nontransferable Licenses: What is the Difference?
质疑可转让许可证价值更高且福利更好的普遍看法，发现配额不严时其价格可能更低，但若消费者剩余与许可证收入权重相等，可转让性更优，并探讨了许可证被国内垄断者控制的可能性。
This paper questions the presumption that transferable licenses are worth more and result in higher welfare. We show that the price of a transferable license may be lower than that of its nontransferable counterpart if the underlying quota is not very severe. However, transferability is preferable to nontransferability if consumer surplus and license revenue have equal weight in the welfare function. We also examine whether licenses will be monopolized by domestic producers with market power. The models have implications for several issues, including the design of pollution permits and how to maximize revenue from ticket sales.