An attempt at making the principal-agent paradigm operational
运用委托代理范式解释加拿大阿尔伯塔省南部甜菜种植者与加工商之间的合同条款如何确定，通过计算一般均衡方法校准最优激励合同，并进行反事实实验分析合同条款和投入对变化的反应。
We adopt the principal-agent paradigm in explaining how the terms of the contract which exists between the growers and the processor of sugar beets in Southern Alberta are determined; adopt the methodology of computational general equilibrium analysis in calibrating the optimal-incentive contract to a benchmark solution; then carry out a series of counterfactual experiments to demonstrate: (1) how the terms of the contract and input use will react to changes in exogenous factors, and (2) how the optimal-incentive contract will differ from its first-best alternative. We find that the parameters which characterize the risk of the situation are of particular importance in determining contractual characteristics.