Marketing Agreement Impacts in an Experimental Market for Fed Cattle
通过模拟育肥牛市场，分析肉类加工企业与饲养企业之间的利润分享营销协议对育肥牛价格水平和波动性的影响，发现协议期间非协议牛的价格和波动性更高，协议参与者价格更低且波动更小，货币激励不影响价格水平但增加波动性。
Abstract Marketing agreements between meatpacking and cattle feeding firms have created concerns about their effects on fed cattle prices. Profit‐sharing marketing agreements were imposed onto a simulated fed cattle market. Price level and variability differences with and without agreements, between agreement participants and nonparticipants, during agreement and nonagreement periods, and between participants receiving and not receiving a monetary incentive were evaluated. Prices and variability for nonagreement cattle were higher during the agreement periods. Marketing agreement participants realized lower, less variable prices than nonparticipating firms. Monetary incentives did not affect price levels but increased price variability.