The Franchise Dilemma: Entrepreneurial Characteristics, Relational Contracting, and Opportunism in Hybrid Governance
利用特许经营数据，研究发现加盟商的创业特征部分影响其机会主义倾向，而关系契约通过强化这种影响反而增加了机会主义行为，揭示了特许经营中的关键困境。
Using franchise data, we identify that entrepreneurial characteristics of franchisees partially impact on their opportunistic tendencies. Further, relational contracting increases franchisee opportunism by strengthening the opportunism‐enhancing impact of entrepreneurial characteristics. These findings point to a key dilemma franchisors need to be aware of: Entrepreneurially minded franchisees who might be better at exploiting market opportunities for their units may also behave more opportunistically, if given the chance through a more relational contracting regime. At the same time, if they perceive the contractual framework as being too rigid, they may be less able to leverage their capabilities, become dissatisfied, and exit the system.