Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and Organizations
主张将科斯的企业边界理论与伯利和米恩斯的代理问题理论整合，以构建更丰富的企业理论，并通过通用汽车与费雪车身的合并案例说明整合的必要性，同时揭示企业总部在资本配置中的关键作用。
Much of the modern research on firm boundaries, following Ronald Coase (1937), assumes that firms are run by owner-managers. This contrasts with the agency literature, following Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means (1932), that emphasizes the problems that arise when managers are not owners. In this paper, the authors argue that a richer theory of the firm should integrate Coase and Berle and Means. They illustrate this point by reexamining the oft-cited merger of General Motors and Fisher Body. The authors also show how linking these literatures can be used to understand one of the key roles of corporate headquarters, the allocation of capital.