战略讨价还价模型与罢工数据的解释

Strategic bargaining models and interpretation of strike data

Journal of Applied Econometrics · 1989
被引 196 · 同刊同年前 10%
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

刻画了消耗战、筛选和信号传递三类战略讨价还价模型对罢工发生率、平均持续时间和和解率的预测,并与加拿大和美国的罢工实证研究特征进行比较,判断哪些模型符合证据。

Abstract

Attrition, screening, and signalling models of strategic bargaining are characterized in terms of their predictions about the incidence, mean duration, and settlement rates of strikes and the terms of wage settlements. These predictions are compared with the general features observed in empirical studies of strikes in Canada and the United States. Conclusions are drawn about the types of models capable of generating these features, and about the conformity of the models to the evidence. Methods are described for computing the numerical examples used to illustrate the models.

战略谈判模型罢工数据工资谈判模型验证