Optimal Auction with Resale
研究当赢家可以转售商品时，卖方如何设计最优拍卖。作者给出了诚实出价的充要条件，并证明在特定条件下可实现Myerson最优配置。
This paper investigates the design of seller–optimal auctions when winning bidders can attempt to resell the good. In that case, the optimal allocation characterized by Myerson (1981) cannot be achieved without resale. I find a sufficient and necessary condition for sincere bidding given the possibility of resale. In two–bidder cases, I prove that the Myerson allocation can be achieved under standard conditions supplemented with two assumptions. With three or more bidders, achieving the Myerson allocation is more difficult. I prove that it can be implemented in special cases. In those cases, the Myerson allocation is generated through a sequence of resale auctions, each optimally chosen by a reseller.