Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
证明在纯公共品经济模型中，当分配集是多维欧氏空间子集且偏好连续凸性时，任何防策略机制都是独裁的，将Gibbard-Satterthwaite定理推广到公共品领域。
This paper investigates the structures of strategy-proof mechanisms in general models of economies with pure public goods. Under the assumptions that the set of allocations is a subset of some finite-dimensional Euclidean space and that the admissible preferencees are continuous and convex, I establish that any strategy-proof mechanism is dictatorial whenever the decision problem is of more than one dimension. Furthermore, I establish a similar result when preference relations also satisfy the additional assumption of monotonicity. These results properly extend the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to economies with pure public goods.