On Credible Delegation by Oligopolists: A Discussion of Distribution Channel Management
质疑了营销文献中关于委托分销（如使用独立中间商）能帮助制造商战略性地提高利润的观点，通过分析发现，在一致假设下唯一均衡是无限层级委托，且若合同不可观察，战略效应消失，因此渠道结构存在需其他机制解释。
Several papers in the recent marketing literature have suggested that delegation in distribution (e.g., the use of independent middlemen) helps manufacturers to precommit strategically to profit-enhancing competitive actions. Further, the literature suggests that the profitability of such actions depends on market structure. We challenge these conclusions here. This is done in two steps. First, we perform an analysis of the entire class of models which have been used in the literature. Using internally consistent assumptions about market structure and contracting, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which all distribution channels have infinitely many levels of delegation. Obviously, this is not what we see in the real world. Next, we relax a key hidden assumption, namely that all intra-channel agreements are observable to competitors. Without this assumption, the usual results unravel. Unless channel members can offer credible guarantees that unobservable agreements do not exist, the strategic effects of delegation disappear. Since these guarantees are virtually impossible to maintain credibly, we would expect to reject the hypothesis in the earlier literature relating channel structure to competition in an empirical study controlling for observability. We conclude that mechanisms other than strategic ones must be responsible for the existence of delegated channels, and make some suggestions about promising avenues for future theory research in channel structure.