Modeling differentiated quality standards in the agri‐food sector: the case of meat trade in the enlarged EU
研究了进口国食品质量标准对出口国市场结构的影响，通过寡头模型分析合规成本与补贴政策，并以波兰肉类行业适应欧盟标准为例进行模拟。
Abstract Quality standards play an increasingly important role in international agri‐food trade, and their functioning as nontariff barriers to trade is widely discussed. We argue that food quality standards imposed by importing countries are more than just border measures and can have profound effects on the market structure of the exporting industry, thereby significantly influencing the supply response. We develop a stylized oligopoly model that accounts for compliance costs (fixed and variable) and investigate alternative policy options to explore different mechanisms an importing county may use to enhance the quality of its imports. The model explicitly recognizes the coexistence of complying and noncomplying firms, which is a situation often found in low‐income countries where a small modern export‐oriented segment invests in meeting foreign quality standards. We use the adjustment of the Polish meat sector to the tight EU food quality standards as an empirical example. The simulations show that a subsidy scheme can promote compliance with standards and can contribute to an upgrade of the industry in the exporting country, but its marginal effectiveness is diminishing.