Risk-based Deposit Insurance: An Incentive Compatible Plan
指出联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）的保费未按银行风险调整，导致银行有动机承担更多风险，并探讨了通过市场约束和风险定价来设计激励相容的存款保险方案。
DEPOSIT INSURANCE PROVIDED by the Federal Deposit Insurance \nCorporation (FDIC) violates a basic principle of insurance: premiums are \nnot adjusted for bank risk. Thus, banks have the incentive to take on more risk, \nincreasing the insurer's liability but not the banks' costs (see Keeton 1984). This \nincentive is heightened further by the FDIC's timidity in closing failed banks. If \nuninsured depositors and other creditors were able and willing to evaluate bank risk \nand demand risk-adjusted returns on investments, the incentive for risk-taking \nwould be weakened, since, in such a world, deposit insurance could be fairly priced \n(see Thomson 1987). When asymmetric information concerning both bank risktaking \nand insurer behavior characterizes the banking market [as Crane (1976); \nAvery, Belton, and Goldberg (1988); Keeton and Morris (1987); and Brewer and \nLee (1986) all suggest to be the case], other remedies must be sought.'