Incentive‐Compatible Pollution Control Policies under Asymmetric Information on Both Risk Preferences and Technology
提出一种方法，在政府仅知农民风险偏好一般类别的情况下，通过随机效率规则设计激励相容的自愿环境政策，并考虑技术类型和投入使用的隐藏信息，模拟纽约污染控制项目发现忽视风险偏好多样性会导致参与激励不足。
This article proposes a method to accommodate asymmetric information on farmers' risk preferences in designing voluntary environmental policies. By incorporating stochastic efficiency rules in a mechanism design problem, the government can find incentive‐compatible policies by knowing only the general class of risk preferences among farmers. The model also accounts for hidden information on technology types and input use. The method is applied empirically to simulate a pollution control program in New York. Results suggest that participation incentives would be inadequate for many risk‐averse producers if the government does not account for the diversity in risk preferences.