POSTING MULTIPLE PRICES TO REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONSUMER PRICE SEARCH*
研究了在消费者价格信息不完全且搜索不充分的情况下，企业发布多个价格或合谋导致消费者比较同一供应商的价格，从而增强垄断力量、提高平均价格，并分析了福利转移及对竞争政策的影响。
In a model of competition with imperfect consumer price information and incomplete price search, some consumers may end up comparing prices originating from the same supplier: either because one firm sets multiple prices or because a group of firms colludes. This leads to added monopoly power for these firms, and average prices in the mixed strategy equilibrium become higher. There is a shift in welfare from consumers to producers, both with exogenous and endogenous consumer search behaviour. However consumers might search more or less with multiple prices. The implications for the price‐setting equilibrium, competition policy and recent judgements are considered.